Free tool · Checklist
Bank-change (remit-to) verification checklist
Bank-change (remit-to) verification checklist
CarrierKYC
Carrier: ________________USDOT: __________Request date: __________Reviewer: ______________
Result: Do not release payment · 0 of 18 steps · 0 of 9 critical
Optional. Saved in this browser only, and printed on the checklist.
01 · Intake
0/4- Critical
Why this step
A written request gives you something to verify against and a record if the payment is ever disputed. A verbal change leaves nothing to check.
Why this step
The exact sender address is what you compare against the file. A lookalike domain one character off is easy to miss once a message has been forwarded.
- Critical
Why this step
In business email compromise the message can come from the carrier's real, taken-over mailbox. The FBI's IC3 advises verifying requests to change account information through a secondary channel.
Why this step
Small mismatches (a new signer, a different phone, a trade name you've never seen) are often the first sign the request didn't come from the carrier.
02 · Call-back
0/2- Critical
Why this step
Fraudsters put their own number in the request so your call-back reaches them. A call-back only proves something if you chose the number.
Why this step
Whoever controls a carrier's FMCSA login can change its listed phone and email, so a fresh change there can point a call-back at the fraudster too.
03 · Identity
0/2- Critical
Why this step
Confirmation from the person who asked proves nothing. Confirmation from someone you verified at onboarding does.
Why this step
USDOT, MC, address and officer names are public. A recent invoice number isn't.
04 · Account ownership
0/4- Critical
Why this step
A voided check proves an account number exists, not who owns it, and checks and screenshots are easy to alter.
- Critical
Why this step
Redirection fraud depends on paying an account the carrier doesn't own. A name mismatch is the clearest sign of it.
- Critical
Why this step
Legitimate carriers rarely need their freight money sent to someone else. When they do, the reason should be on paper and checked.
Why this step
A new account at a bank in a different state from the carrier, with no clear reason, deserves more questions.
05 · Approvals
0/2- Critical
Why this step
One person under pressure can be talked into a change. Two people following the same checklist are much harder to fool.
Why this step
A verified account is only useful if it's the one you actually pay.
06 · Cooling-off
0/2- Critical
Why this step
Fraud depends on speed. A short delay gives the real carrier time to notice, and a confirmed test deposit shows the account works and someone you reached can see it.
Why this step
Fraudsters time changes to land just before a big payment.
07 · Notify
0/1Why this step
If the request was fake, this is how the real carrier finds out in time to stop the payment.
08 · Records
0/1Why this step
If a payment is ever disputed, the file is how you show what you checked and when.
About this tool
Why bank-change fraud costs factors so much
A remit-to change request is the moment a factor decides where the next payment goes. If the request is fake, the money lands in a fraudster's account, the real carrier still expects to be paid, and the funds are often gone before anyone notices. One approved change can redirect every payment after it.
Public-records checks don't catch it. A hijacked carrier keeps its clean authority, insurance and safety record; the only thing that changes is the bank account. That's why the change itself needs its own verification, every time. The remit-to change guide covers the full SOP, and carrier identity theft explains how carriers get taken over in the first place.
Business email compromise
Fake bank changes often arrive by email. In business email compromise (BEC), a fraudster takes over or imitates a real mailbox and sends payment instructions that look routine. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded about $3.05 billion in reported BEC losses in 2025, second only to investment fraud (2025 IC3 Annual Report).
The IC3's advice is the rule this checklist is built on: use secondary channels to verify requests for changes in account information, and check sender addresses and links for misspelled domains (IC3 public service announcement). An email, even from the carrier's real address, is never enough on its own.
Why call-backs must use known numbers
A call-back only proves something if you chose the number. A number in the request, in the email signature or given by the caller may ring the fraudster, who will happily confirm the change. Call the number in your onboarding file, or the one on the carrier's FMCSA record.
FMCSA contact details can be changed too, by whoever controls the carrier's login. If the carrier's MCS-150 was updated shortly before the bank change, treat that as a reason to dig further. The free carrier risk check shows when the record was last updated.
What a good SOP looks like
A good SOP is written down, followed on every change, and doesn't depend on one person's judgment under pressure. The checklist above follows this shape:
- 1
Never on email alone
Every change is confirmed outside the channel it arrived on.
- 2
Independent call-back
To a number already on file, with a contact you already know.
- 3
Proof of ownership
A bank letter or verified ownership check showing the account holder is the carrier, by legal name.
- 4
Two people
A second approver who didn't handle the request.
- 5
Cooling-off
The first payment to a new account is held, or preceded by a confirmed test deposit.
- 6
Notice to the old contact
So the real carrier hears about the change even if someone else asked for it.
- 7
A record
So you can show what you checked, who you called and who approved it.
CarrierKYC's Verified Payee is built to do the ownership step for you: it re-verifies that a new bank account belongs to the carrier on every remit-to change, before the next ACH. See it in the demo.
Frequently asked questions
How do I verify a carrier's bank account change?
Get the request in writing, call the carrier back on a number already in your file (never one from the request), confirm with a contact you know, get a bank letter or verified ownership check showing the account belongs to the carrier's legal name, have a second person approve, and hold or test the first payment to the new account.
Is a voided check enough to verify a new bank account?
No. A voided check shows that an account number exists, not who owns it, and checks are easy to alter. Use a bank letter or an account-ownership verification that returns the account holder's name, and compare it with the carrier's legal name.
What if the carrier says the change is urgent?
Urgency is a pressure tactic, and a real carrier can wait for a call-back and a short cooling-off period. Until the new account is verified, keep paying the verified account on file or hold the payment.
Should we notify the old contact when bank details change?
Yes. Send a confirmation to the contact, email and phone you had on file before the change. If the request was fake, that's how the real carrier can find out in time to stop the payment.
Does this checklist prove a bank change is legitimate?
No. It records that you followed a sound process, which lowers your risk but can't remove it. That's why its best result is "Process meets the checklist", not a verdict on the request itself.
For factoring companies
Stop paying the wrong account.
CarrierKYC verifies that the person onboarding controls the carrier and that the bank account belongs to it, then re-verifies every remit-to change before the next ACH. Free 60-day pilot for small factors.
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The Freight Identity Risk Report
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